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the illegal activity." The Rumfolo court effectively continued this policy
which further indicates that the foundation of the court's rationale lay in
punishing gamblers rather than protecting the public from gamblers.
While the burden imposed on the state by the court does not provide the
full panoply of criminal proceedings, it does assist in safeguarding the
claimant's property rights from the punitive effects of in rem proceedings.
By construing article 18.18 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to
require the state to prove the proceeds were used in gambling and then to
trace it to the respondents, the Texas Supreme Court compels the state to
establish a civil case against the property before the money may be lawfully confiscated. Although some consideration may have been given to the
punitive effects of in rem forfeitures, the principle of stare decisis seems
to have been the guiding force in reaching the decision. The court did not
avail itself of the opportunity to take a fresh look at the constitutionality
of taking private property by means of statutory forfeitures. Instead, the
court reaffirmed the policy of punishment for those engaged in illegal
activities, and did not reach the issue that forfeiture proceedings conducted in lieu of criminal prosecution might violate due process. 2
Curtis Vaughan, III

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Election Contests-Texas Statute
Conferring Jurisdiction on District Courts over Election
Contests is Inapplicable to Contests of
Congressional Elections
Gammage v. Compton,
548 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1977).
Robert Gammage defeated Ron Paul in the November 2, 1976 election
for United States Representative for the Twenty-Second Congressional
District of Texas. Pursuant to his request the state granted Paul a recount,
which was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Texas Elec61. Schwarting v. State, 505 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974, no writ); Demaris v. State, 367 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1963, no
writ); Jones v. Pettigrew, 328 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see Hightower v. Larimore, 156 Tex. 267, 268-69, 295 S.W.2d 654, 655 (1956) (per
curiam).
62. The Supreme Court has indicated the "broad sweep" of statutory forfeitures could,
in some unnamed circumstances, "give rise to serious constitutional questions." CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688-89 (1974).
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tion Code.' Gammage was then certified by the Governor of the State of
Texas as the winner of the election. Alleging election fraud and irregularity,2 Paul filed notices of contest in state district court under the Texas
Election Code' and with the United States House of Representatives under
the Contested Elections Act.' After Gammage was sworn in as a member
of the United States House of Representatives, he filed a motion to dismiss
Paul's suit in the state court contesting the election. The motion was
denied. On February 9, 1977, however, the Texas Supreme Court granted
Gammage leave to file his petition for writ of mandamus to order a dismissal of the suit, Held-Writ granted. Article 9.01 of the Texas Election
Code, which provides that the district court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of election contests, including elections for "federal offices," is inapplicable to contests of elections of members of the United
States Congress.' Any attempt to apply the statute to a congressional
election would violate the United States Constitution.'
At common law no right existed to contest any public election in any
court;7 the only remedy was in the nature of a quo warranto or information.' Texas courts originally had no jurisdiction over election contests
because of their political or extrajudicial nature,9 but in 1891 the Texas
1. TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 7.15, subd. 23 (Supp. 1976-1977). The recount was
conducted under the general observation of inspectors from the Office of the Texas Secretary
of State and counsel from the Privileges and Elections Subcommittee of the United States
House of Representatives. The recount revealed Gammage to be the winner by 268 votes.
Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1977).
2. See Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion). The
contestant Paul alleged that he had knowledge of at least 500 persons who illegally voted for
his opponent in the election, of over 300 ballots that were miscounted, and of at least 300
persons who supposedly voted but either were not residents of the state or were not physically
present within the state on election day. He alleged that in Harris County, 149 more votes
were counted than there were persons voting. He complained of irregularity in the counting
of absentee ballots, alleging that the election judge who initially counted these ballots was a
paid employee of his opponent.
3. TEx. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 9.03 (1967). This article provides in part:
Any person intending to contest the election of anyone holding a certificate of election
for any office mentioned in this law, shall, within thirty (30) days after the return day
of election, give him a notice thereof in writing and deliver to him, his agent or
attorney, a written statement of the ground on which such contestant relies to sustain
such contest.
4. Federal Contested Elections Act of 1969, 2 U.S.C. § 382 (1970).
5. Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. 1977).
6. Id. at 5.
7. McCall v. City of Tombstone, 185 P. 942, 943 (Ariz. 1919) (election contest held to be
special proceeding, being neither action in law nor suit in equity); Johnson v. Du Bois, 294
N.W. 839, 840 (Minn. 1940) (election contest held to be purely statutory).
8. Johnson v. Stevenson, 170 F.2d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 904
(1949).
9. E.g., Ex parte Towles, 48 Tex. 413, 437 (1878); Wright v. Fawcett, 42 Tex. 203, 206
(1875); Rogers v. Johns, 42 Tex. 339, 340 (1875).
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Constitution was amended to give state district courts jurisdiction to adjudicate these contests. 10 Pursuant to that constitutional amendment, the
Texas Legislature enacted a comprehensive election code which now provides that district courts in Texas have exclusive jurisdiction over congressional election contests." Article 9.01 of the Texas Election Code expressly
gives Texas courts jurisdiction over an election contest for "federal offices,"" thereby raising the possibility of a conflict with the election provisions of the United States Constitution. 3 The validity of this article can
best be determined against the backdrop of an evolving national trend to
deny any judicial relief to the contestant in a congressional election. 4
Both state and federal courts have held repeatedly that judicial decisions concerning the validity of a congressional election and the determination as to whether a candidate is entitled to be seated in either the Senate
or the House of Representatives would violate article I, section 5 of the
United States Constitution. 5 This Constitutional provision states that,
"[elach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members."'" Expounding on the meaning of section 5 of
article I of the Constitution, the Supreme Court in Barry v. United States
ex rel. Cunningham7 concluded that the separate houses of Congress
10. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. This provision, as amended, vests the district courts with
original jurisdiction over certain enumerated suits, including election contests, regardless of
the amount in controversy.
11. TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 9.01 (1967) provides:
The district court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all contests of elections, general or special, for all school, municipal, precinct, county, district, state
offices, or federal offices, except elections for the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Comptroller of Public Accounts, Treasurer, Commissioner of the General Land
Office, Attorney General, and Members of the Legislature.
12. Id.
13. See Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Tex. 1977). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5,
cl. 1 provides for the determination of election contests in Congress.
14. See, e.g., Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 619 (1929)
(United States Senate held to have sole authority to judge elections of its members); Keogh
v. Homer, 8 F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Ill. 1934) (federal district court held to have no authority
to judge manner in which candidates in congressional election were elected); Rogers v.
Barnes, 474 P.2d 610, 612 (Colo. 1970) (en banc) (state supreme court held to have no
jurisdiction over contest involving primary election for party nomination to United States
House of Representatives); Laxalt v. Cannon, 397 P.2d 466, 467 (Nev. 1964) (United States
Senate held to have exclusive jurisdiction over election contest for Senate seat).
15. See, e.g., Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1972); Barry v. United States ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 619 n.14 (1929); Manion v. Holzman, 379 F.2d 843, 845 (7th
Cir. 1967); Rogers v. Barnes, 474 P.2d 610, 612 (Colo. 1970) (en banc); Burchell v. State Bd.
of Election Comm'rs, 68 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Ky. 1934). Contra, Durkin v. Snow, 403 F. Supp.
18, 20 (D.N.H. 1974). When the question involved in the suit is "to which of the candidates
the congressional office belongs," the courts are divested of their jurisdiction. Roudebush v.
Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1972).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
17. 279 U.S. 597 (1929). The conflict in Barry arose from an election contest proceeding
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should assume judicial roles when determining the results of an election
or the qualifications of their members." The Court enumerated the powers
granted to Congress by article I, section 5, specifically including the power
"to render a judgment which is beyond the authority of any other tribunal
to review.""' A significant aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in Barry
was the determination that the Senate has "sole authority" over the election contests of its members.2' The "sole authority" concept has been
interpreted as a rejection of the argument that a congressional election
contest in state court is permissible if it does not interfere in any way with
a final congressional determination of the contest.2 Application of this
theory has precluded concurrent jurisdiction of state courts and the Congress over such contests."
State courts generally have based their refusal to grant relief in congressional election contests on one of three major grounds.23 The most prevalent reason for such refusal has been the lack of a state statute expressly
providing for such a contest. Although the majority of states have enacted
statutes that provide for election contest proceedings in many of their
elections,25 few have included a provision for contesting a congressional
election."
being conducted by the Senate to determine the validity of the election of a United States
Senator from Pennsylvania. In the course of the hearing, the Senate appointed a special
committee to investigate campaign contributions. Cunningham, a witness who was called to
testify by the Senate committee, admitted that he had contributed $50,000 to the campaign
but refused to give any information concerning the sources of the money. The Senate passed
a resolution instructing the President to issue a warrant for the arrest of this witness. Upon
execution of the warrant, Cunningham brought a habeas corpus proceeding in federal district
court. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Senate had the power to
punish a recalcitrant witness for contempt. Id. at 609-11.
18. Id. at 616.
19. Id. at 613. The Supreme Court described the other powers granted to Congress by
article I, section 5, including the power to examine witnesses, determine the relevant facts,
and apply the appropriate rules of law. Id. at 613.
20. Id. at 619.
21. See Burchell v. State Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 68 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Ky. 1934); Laxalt
v. Cannon, 397 P.2d 466, 467 (Nev. 1964).
22. Odegard v. Olson, 119 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1963); Laxalt v. Cannon, 397 P.2d
466, 467 (Nev. 1964).
23. Comment, Congressional Election Contests and Recount Proceedings: A Critical
Difference, 72 DICK. L. REv. 433, 433-34 (1968).
24. See, e.g., Odegard v. Olson, 119 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1963) (state election contest
statute does not include contest for congressional office); In re Youngdale, 44 N.W.2d 459,
462 (Minn. 1950) (courts have no jurisdiction over election contests absent statutory authorization); Wyman v. Durkin, 330 A.2d 778, 780 (N.H. 1975) (state statute specifically excluded
contests of elections for congressional offices).
25. Comment, Congressional Election Contests and Recount Proceedings: A Critical
Difference, 72 DICK. L. REv. 433, 435 (1968). See, e.g., CAL. ELECTION CODE § 20021 (Deering
1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 23-19 (Smith-Hurd 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3291
(Purdon 1963).
26. Two states other than Texas which have statutes expressly allowing a judicial contest
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The second ground for denying relief has been that any judicial interference in a congressional election contest would violate article I, section 5 of
the Constitution.27 Persons who have filed contest proceedings in state
courts have attempted to repudiate this particular objection, arguing that
the article I, section 5 powers granted to Congress are not sufficiently broad
to divest the individual states of control over elections held in their state."
The third basis for the state courts' refusal to grant relief in a congressional election contest has been the proposition that such a determination
would amount merely to an advisory opinion.29 Such opinions have been
held to be of no consequence in light of the congressional power of final
determination of an election contest."
In Gammage v. Compton" the Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas
courts have no jurisdiction over congressional election contests. 32 In so
deciding, it rendered inapplicable to congressional election contests that
portion of the Texas Election Code which gives district courts exclusive
jurisdiction of election contests for all federal offices." Although the Election Code does include "federal offices" among those elective offices which
may be contested in the state's courts, the court concluded that the Texas
Legislature did not intend for the term "federal offices" to apply to members of Congress. 4 The court reasoned that under any other construction,
in a congressional election are Connecticut and Georgia. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323
(West 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1702 (1970).
27. See, e.g., Manion v. Holzman, 379 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1967); McLeod v. Kelly, 7
N.W.2d 240, 242 (Mich. 1942); State ex rel 25 Voters v. Selvig, 212 N.W. 604, 604 (Minn.
1927).
28. See Durkin v. Snow, 403 F. Supp. 18, 19 (D.N.H. 1974) (successful contest of congressional election in federal court); Laxalt v. Cannon, 397 P.2d 466, 467 (Nev. 1964) (contestant
unsuccessful in attempt to contest congressional election in state court).
29. Odegard v. Olson, 119 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1963) (court order in congressional
election contest held to be gratuitous and of no force as bearing upon the merits of election
contest pending in House of Representatives); State ex rel 25 Voters v. Selvig, 212 N.W. 604,
604 (Minn. 1927) (state court decision in contest of congressional election would be "officious
and nugatory"); Laxalt v. Cannon, 397 P.2d 466, 467 (Nev. 1964) (state court has no power
to make binding determination of congressional election contest).
30. State ex rel 25 Voters v. Selvig, 212 N.W. 604, 604 (Minn. 1927). The Texas Constitution restricts the jurisdiction of Texas courts to the exercise of judicial power, thus prohibiting
advisory opinions. TEx. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 6, 8; see Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d
331, 332-33 (Tex. 1968); Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 562, 62 S.W.2d 641, 646 (1933).
31. 548 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1977).
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id. at 3. The court, in its attempt to determine the legislative intent behind the
wording of article 9.01, traced the sequence of election contest statutes in Texas, showing
that previous election contest statutes did not include the term "federal offices." Id. at 3.
Compare Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3049 (1911), with Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3041 (1925).
The term "federal offices" was first included in the election contest statute which was enacted
in 1951 as part of a revision of the Election Code. The court indicated that its inclusion was
not a studied recommendation of the Revision Commission. Gammage v. Compton, 548
S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1977).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 9 [2022], No. 2, Art. 11

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

the code would conflict with article I, section 5 of the Constitution. 5 This
decision by the Texas court invalidates article 9.14 of the Texas Election
Code insofar as it applies to contests of congressional elections in state
court.3" The statute directs the trial judge, after hearing the contest provided for in article 9.01, to "decide to which of the contesting parties the
office belongs." 7 This decision brought Texas directly in line with the
majority of those jurisdictions which have considered the issue and have
adopted the general rule that courts have no jurisdiction over the election
of representatives to Congress."
The Texas court expressly rejected the contestant Ron Paul's contention
that a state court's jurisdiction over a congressional election contest is
within the broad powers delegated to the states by article I, section 4 of
the Constitution.38 Paul relied exclusively upon the Supreme Court's decision in Roudebush v. Hartkel0 to support his proposition that the congressional election contest he sought was an integral part of the state's electoral
process and thereby sanctioned by article I, section 4.41
In Hartke the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision, holding
that Indiana's recount procedures did not interfere with the Senate's ultimate authority to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members."2 Prior to this decision, a state recount of the ballots in a congres35. Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1977); accord, Rogers v.Barnes, 474
P.2d 610, 613 (Colo. 1970) (en banc) (state statute purporting to vest courts with jurisdiction
over contests arising out of primary for nomination to congressional seat held unconstitutional).
36. Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1977). TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. art.
9.14 (1967) provides:
Ifany vote or votes are found upon the trial
of any contested election to be illegal or
fraudulent, the trial court shall subtract such vote or votes from the poll of the candidate who received the same, and after a full and fair investigation of the evidence shall
decide to which of the contesting parties the office belongs.
37. TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 9.14 (1967). In Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19
(1972) the Supreme Court said, "Which candidate is entitled to be seated in the Senate is,
to be sure, a nonjusticiable political question-a question that would not have been the
business of this court even before the Senate acted."
38. See, e.g., Barry v.United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 619 n.14 (1929);
Rogers v. Barnes, 474 P.2d 610, 612 (Colo. 1970) (en banc); Odegard v. Olson, 119 N.W.2d
717, 720 (Minn.1963). Contra, Durkin v.Snow,403 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D.N.H. 1974) (state court
contest proceedings do not usurp exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 4, cl. 1 provides: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except
as to the Places of chusing Senators."
40. 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
41. Gammage v.Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1,3 (Tex.1977).
42. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972). For a general discussion of the Constitutional questions raised by Hartke and an analysis of itsimpact on future congressional
election contest cases, see Note, State Control over the Recount Process in Congressional
Elections, 23 SYRACUSE L. Rv.139 (1972).
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sional election contest had been determined by many state courts to be
prohibited by article I, section 5 of the Constitution.43 This restrictive
interpretation was overruled in Hartke with the Court concluding that
state recount procedures would be fully permissible as long as they did not
impair or frustrate the Senate's ability to make an independent determination." The Supreme Court determined that a state's right to conduct a
recount of congressional election ballots is clearly within the broad powers
granted to the states under article I, section 4, as those powers had been
enumerated previously."
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Gammage interpreted
the Hartke rule, but applied it differently to support their opposing positions on the issue of state court jurisdiction over congressional election
contests." The majority effectively distinguished the facts in Gammage
from those in Hartke, noting that Hartke dealt merely with the Indiana
state recount procedure, while Gammage involved numerous allegations of
election fraud and irregularity.47 Indiana, unlike Texas, did not have a
statute vesting its courts with exclusive jurisdiction over congressional
election contests.s Furthermore, Hartke was conditionally seated by the
Senate pending a recount, while Gammage had been unconditionally
seated by the House of Representatives after completion of the electoral
process, including a recount." In light of these differences, the majority in
Gammage took a narrow view of the rule in Hartke, leaving its application
to the specific factual situation presented in that case.50 The Supreme
Court allowed a recount so long as it did not frustrate the Senate's ability
to make an independent judgment, but the Texas court refused to extend
this rule to an actual contest."'
While the majority opinion in Gammage represents a well-reasoned re43. See State ex rel. Beaman v. Circuit Court, 96 N.E.2d 671, 672 (Ind. 1951); Dingeman
v. Board of State Canvassers, 164 N.W. 492, 494 (Mich. 1917).
44. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972).
45. Id. at 25. The Court defined these powers in an earlier case, stating:
These comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration,
supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices,
counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of
election returns; in short to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and
safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental
right involved.
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
46. Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 3-4, 7-8 (Tex. 1977).
47. Id. at 4.
48. See id. at 4.
49. I. at 4. A state recount is an integral part of the state's electoral process. Roudebush
v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972).
50. Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Tex. 1977).
51. Id. at 4.
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fusal to extend the Hartke rule, the court's extensive treatment of that case
misplaced reliance upon a particular facet of the Harthe decision. In a
separate issue in Hartke, the Supreme Court formulated a "judicial inquiry" test for determining whether a federal court could enjoin a state
court proceeding.52 The Texas Supreme Court inferred that this test could
be applied in determining whether any court has jurisdiction over an election contest. 53 While the court was free to make its own determination that
the judicial inquiry necessitated by the contest divested the state court of
its jurisdiction in the case, it was in error in citing Harthe as authority for
such proposition.54 The misinterpretation, nevertheless, is insignificant in
view of the many factual distinctions between the two cases.
The dissenting justices in Gammage broadly applied the rule in Hartke
to the facts in Gammage, suggesting that the state's article I, section 4
powers could be extended to include jurisdiction over congressional election contests. 5 They argued that an election contest in state court would
be permissible so long as it did not interfere with a final determination of
the contest by the House of Representatives." While conceding that the
Congress would have final authority to determine its membership, the
dissenting opinion stated that the adjudication made by a state court
might actually aid the House of Representatives in its inquiry.57 The dissenting justices proposed that under the article 9.01 provision for congressional election contests, Congress and state courts could conduct parallel,
but separate, proceedings. 8 Such jurisdiction necessary to conduct concur52. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 21 (1972). 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) prohibits
federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings. The Court determined in Hartke that
since a state court's duties in connection with a recount are purely administrative and require
no "judicial inquiry," that the federal court had the power to enjoin the state court's administrative function. The judicial inquiry test used by the Court to resolve the jurisdictional issue
in the case clearly had no application to the Constitutional question of whether article I,
section 5 precludes state court jurisdiction over a congressional election contest.
53. See Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1977).
54. In a similar case arising in Louisiana, the Louisiana Court of Appeals misapplied the
judicial inquiry test to the Constitutional issue of jurisdiction over congressional election
contests. The court cited Hartke as authority for the proposition that any controversy arising
out of a congressional election may be settled by the state as long as it does not require a
judicial inquiry. This decision was overruled by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in a memorandum opinion, thus providing no insight to the court's reasons for reversal. See LaCaze v.
Johnson, 302 So. 2d 613 (La. 1974), rev'g 305 So. 2d 140 (La. Ct. App.)
55. Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 7-8 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. at 5 (dissenting opinion).
57. Id. at 12 (dissenting opinion). Contra, Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 32-33
(1972) (dissenting opinion). In his dissent in Harthe, Mr. Justice Douglas expressed his belief
that state officials should not be allowed to recount the sealed ballots in a congressional
election. He explained that when local investigators are free to recompute the results of an
election it will be impossible to preserve the integrity of the evidence for the congressional
determination.
58. Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol9/iss2/11

8

Wright: Texas Statute Conferring Jurisdiction on District Courts over Ele

1977]

CASE NOTES

rent proceedings, however, would appear to be precluded by article I, section 5 of the Constitution."
The dissent's conclusion that the Hartke decision could be read to include congressional election contests within the broad powers delegated to
the states under article I, section 465 seems to misinterpret the Supreme
Court's rationale in Hartke. There is no express or implied authority in
Hartke for the extension of the states' article I, section 4 powers to include
congressional election contests." In fact, the Supreme Court stated in
Hartke that the issue of "which candidate is entitled to be seated in the
Senate is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable political question ....
"I2 In its
failure to recognize the numerous factual distinctions between Hartke and
Gammage, the dissent erroneously attempted to apply the same rule of law
to two factually dissimilar cases.
It is readily apparent that the Texas Supreme Court in Gammage, at
the expense of holding unconstitutional its own election contest statute,
capitalized on the opportunity to adopt the construction of article I, section 5 followed by the majority of state and federal courts. One evident
difference, however, is that the majority of these jurisdictions, unlike
Texas, have not had a statute expressly authorizing jurisdiction of the
state courts over these election contests."3 An examination of the opinions
of other jurisdictions shows that although the majority of state and federal
courts have denied judicial relief in congressional election contests, they
have done so for differing reasons, 4 not always recognizing the unconstitutionality of a statute that attempts to vest in state courts either concurrent
59. See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972) (nonjusticiable political question-state courts have no jurisdiction over such matters); Barry v. United States ex rel.
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 619 n.14 (1929) (sole authority of Senate precludes concurrent
jurisdiction of state courts and Congress over congressional election contests); Laxalt v.
Cannon, 397 P.2d 466, 467 (Nev. 1964) (state court precluded from judging congressional
election contests by Constitutional grant of judicial power to Senate).
60. See Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
61. See id. at 3-4.
62. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972).
63. Comment, Congressional Election Contests and Recount Proceedings: A Critical
Difference, 72 DICK. L. Rv. 433, 435 (1968). Two states other than Texas which have statutes
expressly allowing a judicial contest in a congressional election are Connecticut and Georgia.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1702 (1970).
64. See Manion v. Holzman, 379 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1967) (judicial interference in
congressional election contest would violate article I, section 5 of Constitution); Odegard v.
Olson, 119 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1963) (court order held gratuitous and of no force as
bearing upon merits of election contest pending in House of Representatives); In re Youngdale, 44 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Minn. 1950) (no judicial jurisdiction over election contests absent
statutory authorization); State ex rel 25 Voters v. Selvig, 212 N.W. 604 (Minn. 1927) (state
court decision in contest of congressional election would be "officious and nugatory");
Wyman v. Durkin, 330 A.2d 778, 780 (N.H. 1975) (state statute specifically excluded contests
of elections for congressional offices). See generally Comment, Congressional Election Contests and Recount Proceedings:A Critical Difference, 72 DICK. L. Rv. 433, 433-40 (1968).
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or exclusive jurisdiction over these contests."5 A federal district court in
New Hampshire, seemingly in contravention of the Constitution, recently
held that the state court had jurisdiction over a contested Senate election
because it found no evidence to indicate that the impending state court
action would impede an independent determination of the outcome by the
United States Senate." According to the Gammage rationale, such a finding is irrelevant.
Gammage is significant in that it recognizes congressional supremacy
regarding the elections of its members and enforces the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress over contests resulting from these elections. In its decision,
the Texas Supreme Court has determined with finality that the state cannot usurp this congressional power by enacting a statute which vests its
courts with jurisdiction over congressional election contests. The court
rectified the Constitutional conflict raised by the state's election code and
clarified the relief open to a contestant in a congressional election contest.
Gammage precludes any further attempts by candidates to file suit contesting a congressional election in state court. As a result, the only remedy
open to the contestant is afforded by the Federal Contested Elections Act.67
Although Gammage effectively clarifies the law in Texas concerning
authority to adjudicate congressional election contests, it also signals the
need for a definitive ruling by the United States Supreme Court outlining
in a clear and concise manner precisely those powers which states may
exercise over congressional election procedures in light of article I, section
4. In order to alleviate any further confusion which may arise in the area
of congressional election contests, the Supreme Court should take the first
opportunity to interpret article I, section 5 of the Constitution as barring
any judicial interference in these contests.
Susan G. Wright
65. See Durkin v. Snow, 403 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D.N.H. 1974); Odegard v. Olson, 119
N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 1963) (concurring opinion). In Odegard, the court held that the
Minnesota state courts had no jurisdiction over a congressional election contest. Id. at 720.
In a concurring opinion, however, it was observed that although the courts had no jurisdiction
over these contests under present state law, the legislature was not precluded from conferring
jurisdiction upon the courts to supervise an election contest or recount of the ballots in order
to determine the winner. Id. at 722 (concurring opinion).
66. Durkin v. Snow, 403 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D.N.H. 1974). The court here held that the
election contest proceedings were an integral part of the New Hampshire electoral process
and within the broad powers delegated to the states by article I, section 4 of the Constitution.
Id. at 19. Although the federal district court in Durkin acknowledged the Senate's authority
to make an independent final judgment over the election contests of its members, it expressly
sanctioned state court intervention in a congressional election contest. Id. at 20.
67. Gammage v. Compton, 548 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. 1977).
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